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ABSTRACT 
 
The system of public administration in Northern Ireland has, perhaps inevitably, been of 
secondary concern amid over 30 years of inter-communal sectarian strife. Faced with 
combating terrorism, successive UK governments wouldn’t consider reform of the 
Province’s local public administration, pending a resolution of the wider constitutional 
imbroglio. Consequently, much of the system atrophied, becoming progressively more 
cumbersome and ill-equipped to deal with the requirements of modern government. 
Moreover, to help minimize charges of sectarian discrimination, quangos provided many 
public services, compounding the ‘democratic deficit’ of Direct Rule. In 1998, the Belfast 
(Good Friday) Agreement, offered a breakthrough in the search for a durable settlement 
that could command cross community support. As part of subsequent devolved 
Executive’s ‘Programme for Government’, a Review of Public Administration (RPA) 
was launched to consider sub-regional governance arrangements with a view to 
enhancing democratic accountability and improving efficiency through streamlining the 
current arrangements. To that end, the Review has been committed to adhering to clear 
principles on which any credible reform should be based. While devolution itself has 
proved fitful, the work of the RPA has continued apace. Although embarking on reforms 
within functioning devolution is ministers’ preferred option, there is a determination to 
continue the reform process irrespective of the present impasse. This paper outlines the 
issues, values and concepts that might shape the principles for conducting a Review 
before considering the particular context within Northern Ireland and the impediments to 
overhauling the present arrangements and speculating on the likely outcome (ENDS). 
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The structure and operation of Northern Ireland’s wider system of public administration 
were accorded a lowly priority by successive British Governments throughout ‘the 
Troubles’. With murder and mayhem threatening to engulf them, Northern Ireland Office 
ministers were preoccupied with managing the most intractable and wearisome corner of 
the UK’s territorial estate. As the temporary expedient of Direct Rule matured into 
‘permanent impermanence’, any meaningful overhaul was effectively embargoed. 
Consequently, while recognition of the need for reform enjoyed rare universal consent of 
the key protagonists, ministers felt little inclination to immerse themselves in thankless 
upheaval, the inevitable outcome of which would be controversial, divisive and 
problematic. However, the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement (1998) lifted this extended 
moratorium and, in their ‘Programme for Government’, Northern Ireland’s new political 
masters launched a ‘Review of Public Administration’ in 2002. Moreover, despite the 
subsequently fitful experience of devolution, their resolve has survived the re-imposition 
of Direct Rule. Thus, in the medium term, there is every prospect of substantial reform 
notably sub-regional governance in Northern Ireland. 
 
This paper seeks to accomplish two key objectives. First, it outlines the key issues, values 
and concepts that inform the development of principles for reappraising the continuing 
viability of any system of public administration. Second, it considers the particular 
context obtaining within Northern Ireland and the associated impediments to overhauling 
the present arrangements, speculating on the revised configuration likely to emerge. 
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Issues, Values and Concepts – Developing Principles for Reform 
 
From Local Government to Local Governance 
 
In observing a shift from a welfare to a regulatory state, several commentators in the 
1980s referred to the rise of a post-Fordist regime. ‘Fordist’ mass production, large 
hierarchically organised business organizations, mass consumption and state intervention 
gave way to flexible, small batch and demand-led production, segmented marketing, a 
rise of small and medium enterprises, labour market fluidity and a growing marginalised 
part-time temporary work force (Rhodes, 1997, p.173). Such changing values in global 
political economy have implied changing roles for government, especially at sub-national 
level (Stoker, 1989). Most European countries have experienced local government 
reorganization in the last three decades albeit enormously varied in scope and impact, 
with a high incidence of fundamental reforms and rapid changes (Dente and Kjellberg, 
1988). Just as the expansion of the public sector had obvious consequences for regional 
local government structures in the 20
th
 century so now, the ‘regulatory state’ must 
similarly remodel, subject to the exigencies of territorial management, especially in 
regions that constitute a contested domain. The watchwords of the regulatory state – 
flexibility, fragmentation and marketisation of public services - have had a noticeable 
impact on regional and sub-regional levels via a process of decentralisation. Globalisation 
raises questions over the role of regional and local institutions within a wider 
international framework (Mawson, 1998, p.236). The assumption of self-sufficiency in 
many multi-purpose local government systems, namely, that when given a task, any local 
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authority has to undertake or provide it directly, is no longer automatic - the ‘enabling 
authority’ idea with its purchaser-provider split is commonplace for many services. That 
more rapidly changing societies need a flexible and changing pattern of response has 
become received wisdom. At the heart of the ensuing maelstrom, local government is at 
the “crossroads between society, politics and administration” (p.4) and might be expected 
to bear the brunt of any changes that occur, be they incremental, seismic or otherwise. 
 
The introduction of regional tiers inevitably entails consequences for local government 
(and governance) including the possibility of fundamental overhauls of such structures to 
better suit the new dispensation. As the Council of Europe (CDLR, 2002a) outlines, 
“restructuring of territorial authorities has to be guided by a comprehensive vision of 
theory of governmental structure.” (Appendix 1, Section 2). The design of sub-national 
territorial authorities may be drawn in relation to a number of parameters: size, functions, 
autonomy and mode of operation. In turn, their relationship with the system of sub-
regional governance revolves around similar considerations. However, there is no 
instructor’s manual for operationalising such a ‘comprehensive vision’. Moreover, there 
is little consensus on how any reform might proceed with no generally accepted solutions 
to the problem of the ‘best’ structure for local government. The 
map of European local government offers all kinds of variations. … The very few 
studies carried out up to now show us contradictory and heterogeneous results. 
They all depend on the kind of services included in the analysis, the type of 
demographic structure, the distribution of power within the political system 
(central, federal, asymmetrical federal), the number of tiers of government, the 
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level of public expenditure, the type of competencies established for each level of 
government, and those specifically corresponding to local government, and 
finally, the kind of political culture within each context (CDLR, 2001, para.39). 
 
Definitional difficulties apart, promoting one objective (e.g. ‘efficiency’) at the expense 
of another (e.g. ‘democracy’) is a political problem that requires a political decision. The 
CDLR observed candidly – if unhelpfully for the would-be reformer – that “research 
cannot decide these questions, but it can offer analysis to be taken into consideration in 
the decision-making process, mainly to avoid unfounded decisions” (CDLR, 2001, 
para.28). To the debate have been joined searching questions over the very requirement 
for local government in contemporary society. The post-Fordist stress on market 
processes and citizens being consumers as distinct from political actors “downgraded the 
role of local government considerably in terms of traditional notions of local democracy 
(Cram and Richardson, 1993, p.18). Going further, in a not entirely mischievous 
interrogative, Pierre and Peters (2000) provocatively enquired “Does (local) government 
still matter?” Their question forces a re-examination of first principles, always advisable 
if genuinely committed to a fundamental process of reform. Assuming that it does matter, 
Bovaird, Loeffler and Parrado-Diez (2002) pose alternative questions reflecting “new sets 
of expectations from citizens in their locality” (p.2). Hence: “When does local 
government still matter? What functions could local authorities share with other 
stakeholders?” (our emphasis). In recognizing the changing reality of the governmental 
landscape of the local state, Bovaird et al nonetheless contend, if rather banally, that local 
authorities “still have a very powerful problem-solving capacity with regard to some 
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issues in some contexts” (p.14). Consequently, across Europe, “new networks are also 
developing vertically between levels of government. There seems to be a desire both at 
central and sub-national levels to transform traditional hierarchical relationships more 
into co-operative relationships, or even partnerships” (p.19). Traditional modes of 
decision-making and delivery have changed.  
 
In proclaiming a new world of local governance, even the UK Government has 
acknowledged local authorities’ pre-eminence. “Councils are ideally placed to work with 
government, their communities and the wider range of public, private and voluntary 
sector bodies who operate at local level and who need to come together if these 
challenges are to be successfully addressed” (DETR, 1998, p.79, cited in Stewart, 2003, 
p.15). A renaissance of the political dimension of local authorities is discernible. For 
example, Bovaird et al (2002) note a new concern for old values such as equity, ethics, 
trust and transparency which go beyond the ‘3Es’ of NPM (economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness). There are multiple stakeholders’ approaches to public services (design, 
production and evaluation), to problems in the local community, and to the decision 
mechanisms by which strategies should be made. To solve – or at least better manage – 
wicked issues, use will be made of coordinating instruments e.g. strategic plans and 
partnerships. ICT, such as virtual networks / e-governance, will grow in significance. 
Concurrently, it is likely that the shift to governance will be joined 
by efforts to reinforce those areas of local public administration which have 
emerged in the ‘local governance era’ as particularly weak. These include in 
many (but not all) European countries: the role of politicians in community 
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leadership; the role of political parties in civic management; the role of 
professionals in innovations around service co-production; and, the role of 
managers in developing the capacity of alternative service providers in the 
community (p.235). 
 
Criteria for Reform 
 
Despite the lack of consensus on their relative importance, it is possible to establish some 
basic principles so that those charged with making political judgments might be 
reasonably informed in their deliberations and determinations. According to the European 
Charter of Local Self-Government, a prerequisite of local democracy is a clear division of 
responsibilities between central and local authorities, the assigning of financial resources 
of their own to local authorities, commensurate with the tasks for which they are 
responsible, and freedom for them to decide how to use these. Further, it commits 
signatories to apply “basic rules guaranteeing the political, administrative and financial 
independence of local authorities … [embodying] the conviction that the degree of self-
government enjoyed by local authorities may be regarded as a touchstone of genuine 
democracy” (Norton, 1994, p.19). However, a dichotomy exists between countries that 
consider their local authorities as service delivery institutions and others that see 
municipalities as mainly political and representative institutions. Thus, for the CDLR 
“Democratic quality and efficiency are elements that should be confined in the best 
possible manner (note 7). … In striking that balance, there are many ways in which 
democratic participation can be expressed, not only in the electoral arena. Indeed, there 
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are connections between participation and service delivery, for example, where user-
groups of citizens are created to evaluate the type and quality of services delivered” 
(CDLR, 2001, para.9). Historical circumstances, local specificities and/or value 
judgments yield different approaches to a common dilemma: what is the ‘ideal’ size for 
local authorities? Ideologies, mentalities and interests inform the debate whose 
considerations include efficiency, democracy, promotion of economic development, and 
distribution though, since these are inherently normative evaluations, securing agreement 
on a conceptual framework still less a blueprint is elusive (paragraph 12). Thus, whereas 
“the assignment of territory, competency and functions between levels of government 
should not be a shibboleth to the past, nor to a particular economic or political theory”, 
tensions exist between 
activity spaces which form the basis of participation and technical and 
bureaucratic criteria for optimal administrative design. In geographical terms this 
relates to the question of how the administrative space is bounded. The ideal is of 
an activity space which is precisely matched by administrative boundaries; that is, 
‘truly bounded’. In this case people’s personal lives and contact patterns give a 
natural ‘sense of community’ which encourages in a direct way a high level of 
participation in administration: the two reinforce each other. However, under and 
over bounding also occur (Bennett, 1989, pp.33-5) (see Figure 1 which illustrates 
the ‘bounding’ concept). 
 
‘Bounding’ gives an important means of approaching the territorial structure of 
administration, particularly by which its reform can be developed. For decades, securing 
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‘bounding’ has been associated with the objective of increasing size. And yet, as Derek 
Senior’s (1969) dissenting memorandum to the Report of the Redcliffe-Maud 
Commission on English local government argued: “no objective basis exists on which to 
attribute any material significance to population size as a factor in any way influencing 
the performance of local government [Vol.2 p.268]”. Indeed, while administrative 
economies of scale to induce efficiency are theoretically possible, bureaucratic overload, 
distance from the consumer, the difficulties of participation, and adaptation of decisions 
to needs has led to a dominance of practical inefficiency through diseconomies of scale 
with size and consequent alienation of the population served. Contending that 
administrative systems are “naturally subject to obsolescence”, Bennett observed the 
“new fashion is flexible decentralisation – smaller scale and the importance of individuals 
over collectives but also flexible aggregation, that is, a means of linking small units and 
their competencies and financial resources to gain economic/technical efficiency” (p.51). 
Examples would include the experience within England’s metropolitan counties after 
1986, or Scotland and Wales after 1992. The parallels with the broader notion of the 
differentiated polity are striking (see Rhodes, 1997; Ladner, 2005). 
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Under bounded  Over-bounded  Truly-bounded 
 
 Administrative spaces (dotted lines) 
 Activity spaces (solid lines) 
 
 Figure 1. Forms of bounding of administrative spaces 
Source: Bennett (1989, p.35) 
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Local government’s primordial role, like any polity, reflects a sense of common identity 
among its citizens which at its most basic may be defined as the consciousness that they 
have more in common with each other than they have with people living beyond their 
community boundary. Such consciousness is the sine qua non of a democracy. In de 
Tocqueville’s aphorism: “man creates kingdoms and republics but townships seem to 
spring from the hand of God” (cited in Sharpe, 1988, p.91). In truth, however, the 
rationale for local government has always had both functional and non-functional origins. 
It depends which role has the priority – i.e. reflector of the subjective community or 
provider of services. While reconciling “the two desiderata simply by pitching the local 
government system at its smallest feasible scale” is possible, the “functional range is far 
too narrow for what most Western states regard as being appropriate for local 
government. And, in any event, such self-contained communities no longer exist, given 
the functional revolution and urbanization/sprawl” (Sharpe, 1988, p.91). Given the 
political dimension of change, rational efficiency arguments rarely explain local 
government structural modernization anywhere, including the UK (pp.94-5). 
 
Various national reports made “it fairly clear that, primarily, the size of a local authority 
is a function of the services expected from it” (Zehetner, quoted in Norton, 1994, p.38). 
However, reflecting Europe’s north/south dichotomy, charges of functional obsolescence 
are less valid in those states based on the Napoleonic model since the primacy of local 
government is its political cum representative role. “…freed from the incubus of 
functionality, [they] can survive”. Also, the “art of colonizing the centre – via national 
parties and the cumuls des mandates principle” – doesn’t obtain in northern Europe. 
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Those elements at the Centre may also prefer the status quo of weak local government 
since their position is de facto stronger (p.97). 
Small authorities were encouraged to form joint bodies to exercise functions 
requiring large areas and resources, delegate functions upwards, contract services 
out and adopt other means by which limitations of smallness might be overcome. 
But the result could be that although communal powers were maintained in 
principle, effective communal control of key services was lost (p.38). 
 
Also, in joint compact or partnership arrangements, there can be problems of coherence 
or ‘joined-up-ness’. By contrast, however, in the non-Napoleonic group, including the 
UK as “the extreme case” (p.38), growing public pressure for fairness, minimum 
standards and equality for all in the provision of public services may dilute local 
government’s role as a representative body (Sharpe, 1988, p.100). In many ways, this is a 
testament to the fact that local authorities throughout the British Isles have always been 
more ‘administrative’ than ‘governmental’ given their lack of general competence 
(notwithstanding the recent introduction of ‘well-being’ powers), and reflects a 
longstanding debate within the UK over the intrinsic value of local forms of governance 
which became crystallized around essentially two poles. Utilitarian reformers like Jeremy 
Bentham maintained that “local government units should be organized so as to efficiently 
undertake administrative functions according to the rules determined by a popularly 
elected national parliament” (Chandler, 1991, p.29). Within this tradition of liberal 
centralism, the administrator Edwin Chadwick envisaged a system of local government as 
an ‘agent’ for the centre (known as ‘the principal’) charged with providing minimum 
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national standards. Chadwick was deeply hostile to what he identified as entrenched 
power for a minority and spoke of the “fallacy that local government is self-government” 
(cited in MacKenzie, 1961, p.8). If somewhat strange an outlook for a liberal ostensibly 
committed to a diffusion of political power within the polity, the widespread albeit rather 
trivial examples of corruption prevalent at the time nourished such views. In contrast, 
others such as Joshua Toulmin Smith, with localist ideas of organic evolution, advanced 
the notion of partnership between the centre and localities believing local self-
government to be the “rock of our safety as a free state”. Nonetheless, while Toulmin 
Smith et al “probably prevented the wholesale destruction of parish government”, the 
liberal onslaught eventually triumphed and local government underwent substantial 
reform and consolidation in terms of its structural configuration and functional 
responsibilities (Chandler, 1991, p.30). Thereafter, the triumph of liberal centralism 
“justified generations of British administrators in continuing reorganizations which had 
little regard to the principles of local social responsibility. It also cut Britain off from the 
constitutionalism of the continent” (Norton, 1994, p.26). More recently, Pratchett (2004) 
considered the debate in terms of the ‘new localism’ as a policy approach in the UK. 
Replete with references to ‘earned autonomy’ and ‘constrained discretion’, ‘new 
localism’ resonates closely with Benthamite utilitarianism. Whatever additional powers 
accorded to local authorities, ‘new localism’ has done “little to shift power relations in 
favour of localities” (p.371). At best, Labour’s “‘new localism’ may have managed to 
clarify some of the complexities that bedevil central-local relations [but] its capacity to 
resolve the dilemma seems limited” (p.373) 
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In another departure from European practice, British ‘exceptionalism’ witnessed growing 
use of ‘special purpose’ authorities that burgeoned under Conservative Governments after 
1979. The arrangements post-abolition of the Greater London Council and Metropolitan 
County Councils, as well as the Area Boards in Northern Ireland, typify such bodies. The 
resultant “criss-crossing boundaries of service authorities” was described as ‘organised 
chaos’ by Owens and Norregaard (1991, pp.8-9). A rationale for such a configuration is 
offered from economic theory on optimum size that predicts a model in which the local 
level is characterised by a multitude of partly overlapping (in a spatial sense) public or 
semi-public units, each providing specific services (pp.8-9). However, there are limits to 
the proliferation of separate authorities. The resultant misconceptions distort 
considerations of structural reform of British local government. In the 1990s, whether by 
ministerial fiat in Scotland and Wales, or through England’s tortuous ‘independent’ Local 
Government Commission, reorganization was hampered by an unseemly mix of political 
expediency, dubious provenance and procedural muddle. The result, argued Stewart 
(2003), was that “while one expects that form should follow functions, in the 
reorganization process, form preceded functions and structure came before purpose. …. 
The phrase ‘unitary authority’ is misleading. All it means is that there is a single tier of 
local government, not that unitary authorities bring together all the powers of government 
exercised at local level or even those exercised through local organizations” (p.184). The 
outcome is that lower tiered and unitary authorities in the UK are some “ten times larger 
in population than their equivalents in Europe” (p.43), reflecting the assumptions of size-
ism prevalent within British public administration. Local authorities are viewed as 
agencies for the provision of service despite there being no clear link between size and 
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efficiency/effectiveness. As Stewart lamented, a “moment’s consideration of European 
local government might have caused reflection. …. Both the sense of community and the 
requirements of services are multi-leveled and do not fit a single tier” (p.184). 
 
A final but critical consideration is finance. Owens and Norregaard (1991) identify two 
principal types of authority – comprehensive and constrained. Comprehensive authorities 
have powers over both spending and revenue. Constrained authorities can determine the 
allocation of spending but not the overall level of budget/tax revenues (pp.62-63). More 
than ever before, British local authorities (outside Northern Ireland and, before 
nationalization of business rating in 1993, a handful of mainland authorities which 
possessed high non-domestic ratebases) exemplify the latter, their overwhelming 
dependency on central government grant leaving them hostage to the capricious ‘gearing 
effect’. Transparency is a necessary condition of accountability with the balance of 
funding making “an enormous difference” (House of Commons Select Committee (HC, 
1998, cited in Stewart, 2003, p.228). The argument is not so much about local autonomy 
as it is about local accountability. Drastic change in the balance of funding warrants new 
sources of local taxation (p.228). 
 
Lessons for Undertaking Reform  
 
The foregoing review is the necessary precursor to examining ‘real world’ situations. 
Theoretical abstractions notwithstanding, a distillation of the literature yields several key 
lessons that bear on any review exercise. Above all, the prime lesson, as the CDLR 
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stressed, is that any decisions on reform rest ultimately on subjective, political judgments. 
Basically, it is inconceivable that political factors would not colour (even subliminally) 
outcomes. Even in a ‘normal’ context, the calculus of crude party political advantage 
compromises dispassionate technocratic solutions; in divided societies or where the 
state’s very legitimacy may be contested, such considerations assume immeasurably 
heightened significance. For example, the effects of investing new functions with elected 
local councils are potentially contentious. Similarly, reconfiguring boundaries entails 
immediate implications for the party political complexion of new local authorities. 
 
Beyond weighing political impacts, however, several second order factors – in effect, the 
‘comprehensive vision’ to which the CDLR referred - merit consideration for, despite the 
susceptibility to political machinations, some concession should be made to ensuring 
objective criteria exist before embarking on change. First, intending reformers must 
recognize a new post-Fordist reality. Government through most-purpose local authorities 
has been transformed into a variegated pattern of governance in which figure not only 
traditional local authority units but also an array of other public, private and 
community/voluntary organizations. In particular, the emergence of partnership 
arrangements as a means of raising popular engagement with the policy process has been 
striking in recent years, firmly established within the received wisdom of what constitutes 
good government. Second, reflecting Bennett’s notion of ‘bounding’, there is a need to 
ensure that any revised administrative boundaries relate to activity spaces. Third, also 
related to bounding, is size. Despite lip-service paid to local government’s role in 
ensuring a sense of community identity which usually favour smaller units, these appear 
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subordinate to the requirement of optimising functional capacity, which favour larger 
units. Thus, in reconciling the two, the balance lies towards the large end of the size 
spectrum, particularly in the case of local authorities with a wider range of functions. 
European evidence suggests, however, that seeking a ‘one size fits all’ solution does not 
work and that reconciling sense of community and functional efficiency demands 
multiple tiers. Fourth, while economic theory suggests a fragmented model of ‘organised 
chaos’ in terms of the configuration of local units, practicalities demand substantial 
consolidation. Finally, in intergovernmental relationships, there is the perennially vexed 
issue of finance. Simply, transparency demands realism in resource allocation, aligning 
functional responsibilities with financial capacity. 
 
What has become clear in the reform process is that local community politics matter in 
Northern Ireland in the prolonged absence (or sporadic functioning) of a regional tier. 
The strength of local identity, evident within emasculated councils, defies imposition of a 
‘one size fits all’ solution favoured by Westminster and Whitehall through direct rule 
ministers. These push and pull tensions are being played out in a number of ways as the 
reform of public administration progresses. There has been a political backlash against 
attempts to ‘direct’ councils towards accepting a 7 council ‘optimal solution for service 
delivery’ (OFMDFM, 2005: 40). Local politicians are deeply suspicious of proposals 
which now favour the retention of a plethora of non-departmental public bodies, albeit 
with improved accountability. Equally, the reformers have suggested that Executive 
Agencies should remain untouched - decisions on their future are to be left for a returning 
devolved Assembly. All of this smacks of regulatory capture by a reform team 
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comprising civil servants perceived to be ‘looking after their own’, overseen by direct 
rule ministers who hold an over-simplified view of administrative reform based on 
rational ‘solutions’. It is to the detail of the reform process that we now turn. 
 
 
Public Administration in Northern Ireland and its Reform 
The Status Quo 
 
Several factors ensure that the system of public administration in Northern Ireland differs 
in crucial respects from that within the rest of the UK. On a practical level, population 
(c.1.7m inhabitants) coupled with its geographic extent ensure an idiosyncratic 
governmental configuration and associated delineation of functions. Politically, however, 
a contested constitutional status demands that solutions reflect both the history and 
distinctiveness of the Province’s status within the Union and relationship with its 
southern neighbour, as well as seeking to reconcile a bitterly divided community. Since 
1972, though a short-term palliative pending a more durable agreed settlement, Direct 
Rule instead became a long-term political fix aimed at containment. The ‘permanent 
impermanence’ (Knox, 1996) it entailed ushered in a system of political administration 
whose baffling intricacies inspired little public confidence still less comprehension. 
Progressively, both the Senior Civil Service and unelected ministerially-appointed 
quangos acquired an enhanced role and disproportionate influence over the formulation, 
development and implementation of public policy in Northern Ireland, creating a tighter 
and more intimate policy network than in Scotland or Wales, and in which administrative 
imperatives and interests predominated. The resultant “technocracising of politics” (Ditch 
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and Morrissey, 1979, p.111) reflects the effective absence of pluralist liberal democracy 
as commonly understood. 
 
While the Troubles were the catalyst for macro political change in Northern Ireland, 
dissatisfaction with the existing sub-regional arrangements had been mounting since the 
War. The inability of the local government system to provide services efficiently 
precipitated the growth of ad hoc statutory bodies and the removal and centralization of 
council functions (Knox, 2003, p.461). Eventually, pressure built to overhaul a Victorian 
creation comprising too many small councils, inadequately resourced through a limited 
rate base and overly dependent on central grant for their income (Hayes, 1967). Although 
the Stormont Government responded with a series of consultations (NIG, 1966, 1969), 
the subsequent criticisms of local government outlined in the Cameron Report (1969) 
prompted the appointment in 1969 of an independent Review Body on Local 
Government, chaired by Sir Patrick Macrory.  
The problem facing the Review Body was to construct a local government system 
appropriate to a situation in which Stormont – at that time the Northern Ireland 
equivalent of central government – had been or would be allocated all those major 
services which, in other parts of Britain, are regarded as wholly or partly the 
responsibility of local authorities (Alexander, 1982, p.50). 
 
In what amounted to a quantum leap in residualisation that characterised Northern 
Ireland’s local government, Macrory envisaged a two-tier structure: a lower tier of 
district councils, with Stormont serving as the de facto top tier of local government, 
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coterminous with the Province, and responsible for ‘regional’ services accompanied by 
an array of area boards. However, the imposition of Direct Rule superceded the reform, 
creating what was dubbed the ‘Macrory Gap’ – having removed erstwhile local services, 
these were now subject to the decisions of British rather than Northern Ireland ministers. 
Consequently, in what would become the limiting case of extended central control, trends 
which had seen a further upward shift of functional competence from lower to upper tiers 
of local government in Great Britain (to the counties in England and Wales and regions in 
Scotland) were reflected in Northern Ireland. That is, the formal system of local 
government would comprise 26 district councils albeit “best thought of as the lower tier 
in a system that simply lacks a democratically elected higher level of local government” 
(Hampton, 1991, p.54). While the map of district boundaries themselves largely satisfied 
Bennett’s concept of ‘bounding’, the addition of several layers of other bodies – Area 
Boards, regional bodies (and their sub-divisions) and Parliamentary constituency 
boundaries – vitiated any overall sense of being fully bounded (see Figures 2-5, below). 
 
Quangos became the mainstay of Northern Ireland’s governance, providing most public 
services and accounting for two thirds of the devolved budget. While they accentuated 
the democratic deficit, quangos proved valuable – amidst the quagmire of sectarianism - 
for administering and delivering public service largely free from controversy. However, 
questions of legitimacy and accountability are accompanied by concern over efficiency 
given the plethora of bodies. Simply, Northern Ireland is over governed – or, to be 
precise, over-administered. Lammenais’ (1848) adage: “apoplexy at the centre and 
anaemia at the periphery”, encapsulates the state of public administration within Northern 
Ireland after 1973. 
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Figure 2: Northern Ireland 26 District Councils after 1973 
 
 
 
Solid Lines – Boundaries of the 5 Education and Library Boards  
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Thin Lines – Boundaries of the 26 District Councils 
 
Figure 3: Northern Ireland Education and Library Boards 
 
 
Solid Lines: Boundaries of the 4 Health and Social Services Area Boards 
Thin Lines: Sub-divisions/districts of the Health and Social Services Area Boards 
Figure 4: Northern Ireland Health and Social Services Area Boards 
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Figure 5: Northern Ireland Parliamentary Constituency Boundaries 
The Reform Process 
 
Beyond contributing to peace, devolution also offered the prospect of dramatically 
rebalancing the political-administrative nexus (democratising the quangos/reinvigorating 
local councils). Indeed, this secondary dimension has assumed increasing prominence, 
given the continuing uncertainty over the fate of devolution. However, Northern Ireland’s 
political masters were confronted with an immediate problem – should they assume that 
devolution will be restored or should any proposals for reform be adaptable to an 
extended period of Direct Rule. Indeed, should two alternative systems be planned. In the 
event, it fell to the devolved Executive to commence the process of brokering change. 
 
Thus, a ‘Review of Public Administration’ (RPA) was launched on 24 June 2002. The 
origins of the RPA were in the Programme for Government in which the Executive 
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pledged from the outset to “lead the most effective and accountable form of government 
in Northern Ireland” (NIG, 2001). David Trimble MLA, the then First Minister, argued: 
The RPA is one of the major tasks facing the Executive and will be central to the 
way in which we deliver, structure and organize our public services in the future. 
This is the opportunity of a generation to put in place a modern, accountable, 
effective system of public administration that can deliver a high quality set of 
public services to our citizens. It is an opportunity we must take (Hansard, 
25/2/02). 
 
Northern Ireland has moved from a position of ‘democratic deficit’ to surfeit mode with 
18 MPs, 108 MLAs, 582 local councilors and 3 MEPs. Aside from considerations of 
political representation, rationalizing the bureaucracy surrounding public service 
provision was central, as the Assembly struggled (devoid of tax-varying powers except 
the Regional Rate) to meet rising public expectations within a finite budget. The 
Assembly inherited a system of over 150 non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs) (with 
in excess of 2000 appointees). Just one example illustrates the problem. In education, as 
well as the Stormont Department of Education, there are five Education and Library Area 
Boards, the Governing Bodies’ Association, the Irish Medium Schools’ Body, the 
Northern Ireland Council for Integrated Education, the Regional Training Unit, the 
Council for Catholic Maintained Schools, and the Council for the Curriculum, 
Examinations and Assessment. In England, one LEA per area would normally suffice. As 
one trade unionist in the education sector remarked: “There is chronic over administration 
of schools in NI. A radical overhaul is required and this rebalance is long overdue” 
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(Frank Bunting, NI Secretary, Irish National Teachers’ Organisation, cited in Belfast 
Telegraph, “Overhaul needed ‘to get funds to schools’”, 6/5/04, p.7). To satisfy the 
requirements of a power-sharing executive, a cumbersome system of 11 government 
departments (to replace six) was also introduced. 
 
The First and Deputy First Ministers suggested among the most important issues 
addressed by the review would be structure, accountability and responsibilities of local 
government, NDPBs and government agencies. Ministers agreed the Review is likely to 
have implications for the functions exercised by the Executive even if the institutions 
established by the Agreement and the division of functions were not to be considered. In 
general, politicians welcomed the Review, not least because there is a residual anti-
quango feeling overhanging from Direct Rule. A majority of MLAs are also local 
councillors and experienced at first hand relative powerlessness as elected representatives 
working on behalf of their constituents. The scope of the RPA has, however, proved 
controversial. Some politicians questioned the effectiveness of an exercise which 
excludes the Stormont departments, a theme articulated by trenchant critic of the 
Agreement, Robert McCartney MLA.  
Everyone accepts that quangos, or many of them, must go and they should have 
gone long ago.  They represented the veneer or cosmetic surface that several 
British Governments used to give a semblance of democratic accountability to 
Direct Rule. …. Everyone agrees that there must be a great pruning back. 
However, that disguises the fact that superimposed on top of a layer of 
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undemocratic agencies was a layer that, in some respects, was little better – 
devolved government (Hansard, 24/6/02). 
 
These calls were rejected as seeking to “renegotiate the Agreement by the back door” and 
a distraction from main emphasis of the Review. Other reactions centred on how the 
Review should be undertaken. Calls for a ‘Macrory II’, i.e., an independent enquiry, were 
rejected. Unlike the 1960s and 1970s, when Governments preferred (Royal) 
Commissions, the Executive eschewed an independent enquiry. Instead, the Review is led 
by a multi-disciplinary team of officials in the Office of the First Minister and Deputy 
First Minister (OFMDFM), working with the advice of a team of independent experts 
(Tom Frawley, the NI Ombudsman, is in charge of the consultation process), and 
reporting to an Executive sub-committee. Concerns were expressed that a review led by 
officials from the OFMDFM amounted to regulatory capture by civil servants and the 
Executive, with independent experts offering only a façade of objectivity. Seamus Close 
MLA argued:  
When politicians are seen to be examining themselves, and when they consult, the 
answer that comes back is invariably the answer that the politicians want to end 
up with, not the answer that the people demand. If we allow the OFMDFM or the 
Committee of the Centre to conduct this review, we will not get the result that the 
people who sent you here demand and deserve (Hansard, 25/2/04) 
Moreover, the in-house management of the review prompted criticism that both pro-
Agreement Executive parties and civil servants are keen to protect the configuration of 
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both devolved political institutions and central government department, regardless of 
administrative logic. 
 
Challenges for the Review 
 
Several major challenges confronted the Review. Securing an appropriate level of 
political accountability demands hard choices about the future role of local government 
and NDPBs. There is a need to release and reassign resources within the restrictive 
Westminster-controlled Northern Ireland Block of public expenditure towards local, 
needs assessed, public service priorities. Simultaneously, however, it must also adhere to 
the principles of equality and human rights that form the heart of the Agreement. It must 
continue to adopt what is best in the modernizing agenda of New Public Management 
such as ‘best value’, responsiveness to customers, market awareness, being more 
entrepreneurial, structural de-layering and downsizing and promoting a shift from 
appointed to elected bodies. Among crucial questions figure: (1) What should be the 
optimal distribution of functions between the various tiers of government – regional, sub-
regional and local? (2) If the view is that under devolution a number of the executive 
NDPBs need to be integrated into the mainstream departments or councils, how best 
should this be done? (3) Given the size of NI, could services be rationalized at two levels 
– Stormont and local government? (4) If so, how should those services be allocated and 
how many local authorities would be needed to deliver any proposed functions? 
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Despite the suspension of the NI Executive and Assembly (now for the fourth time), 
Direct Rule Ministers have permitted – indeed, facilitated and encouraged the Review to 
continue in the hope, if not the expectation, that once devolution is restored, the 
momentum of reform can be maintained. Regardless of its outcome, the Review has trail 
blazed in its innovative efforts to achieve a thoroughgoing analysis of the wider public 
sector, including commissioning a series of specialist briefing papers, extensive 
consultations, omnibus surveys, as well as promoting widespread dissemination via the 
internet (for full details, see www.rpani.gov.uk). 
 
A major challenge has concerned the scope of the review. Many politicians and senior 
civil servants regard the departmental structures established under the Agreement as 
sacrosanct while Stormont politicians, starved of executive authority under Direct rule, 
eschew any notion of local subsidiarity. The attitude of Stormont may exemplify bureau 
shaping behaviour by civil servants and politicians, whereby they use changes to 
organizational structures to enhance their own welfare. Consequently, buoyed by 
protection conferred by the in-built exclusion of government departments, some civil 
servants have been promoting the exercise as a ‘review of local government’ and ‘culling 
councils’ from 26 to 8, 6 or even 5. Ironically, local government’s centrality in the 
Review belies its small budget (5% of the devolved block), limited scope for additional 
VFM savings, and self-evident democratic credentials. In truth, as former Deputy First 
Minister, Seamus Mallon MLA, remarked: “It is clear from the expenditure that local 
government is a crucial part of this. However it is only a part. The general administration 
is crucially important” (NIA Oral questions, 11/12/2000). 
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Outwith Stormont, quangos and other public bodies have underscored the sense that the 
‘a review of local government’ is afoot, given their remarkably low key reaction 
considering their own vulnerability to the Review’s deliberations. Partly, lacking an 
organizing umbrella body, the case against such quangos often goes by default. 
Moreover, by contrast, local government has readily acquiesced in the ‘review of local 
government’ thesis. Galvanised through a newly created NI Local Government 
Association, the widespread feeling has been that ‘our time has come’. Councils crave the 
opportunity to exert more influence over other public sector providers in their areas - a 
focus of accountability without necessarily having to take on the role of service deliverer 
although this thinking is often constrained by an inability to think outside the existing 
parameters of the present structures. It presupposes that the Review, like the devolution 
which precipitated it, automatically entails a revised and expanded role for councils 
when, as Scottish, Welsh and (potentially English) experiences illustrate, devolution 
frequently entails local government losing powers up to the devolved regional/national 
tier.  
 
A further related challenge concerns the future of the Northern Ireland Civil Service’s 25 
Next Steps Agencies. Unlike their parent departments, Agencies are included in the 
Review, underscoring the point that this is a wider review of public administration, not 
simply local government. Accounting for c.80% of civil servants, Agencies spend large 
sums of public money being integral to the functioning of government, providing several 
erstwhile local government services (such as water, roads, planning, and rates collection) 
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(Carmichael, 2002). Therefore, a proper evaluation of their role and future is unavoidable 
if the Review’s recommendations are to carry conviction. However, as yet, Agencies 
have been quietly sidestepped, a process to which Agencies have been willing 
accomplices. Already, one Agency (Training and Employment) has been reabsorbed into 
its parent department (Employment and Learning) following devolution on grounds of 
the latter’s otherwise ‘non-viable’ situation. It seems likely that any recommendations for 
particular Agencies may well entail similar implications for their respective departments, 
in another example of how, whether intentional or not, the Review’s recommendations 
will have spillover effects for the 11 central departments. 
 
Models for Reform 
 
In October 2003, the RPA team launched a public consultation document that set out five 
possible models for consideration in rethinking the structural architecture of public 
services. In keeping with the innovative theme of the Review process, the consultation 
document is user friendly. Echoing the “comprehensive vision” commended by the 
CDLR and academic literature, it sets out the principles of characteristics that any 
proposed new system of public administration must satisfy, reflects on ways in which we 
can deliver and improve public services (in particular, through enhanced mechanisms for 
accountability and participation) and offers five ‘high-level’ models for consideration on 
the future roles of central government, public bodies and local government. The five 
models are summarized thus: 
1. Status quo: no change in the overall structure of public administration 
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2. Centralised: all major services delivered directly by government departments. 
3. Regional and sub-regional public bodies: a range of public bodies, operating 
either regionally or sub-regionally, would deliver public services 
4. Reformed status quo with enhanced local government: while keeping the main 
features of the current system, democratically elected local authorities would be 
vested with new responsibilities. 
5. Strong local government: major public services would be the responsibility of a 
smaller number of new local councils. 
Interestingly, despite its remit, the Review adroitly intimates that it is likely to have 
implications for the functions exercised by the Executive. 
 
Some 170 responses were made to the consultation document. No consensus emerged on 
what functions might be returned to councils but most of the main political parties 
endorsed models 4 and 5, with some wishing elements of model 3 to be included. In 
addition, an insistence on appropriate safeguards (in terms of minority protection etc) has 
been made, especially by nationalists, but also by Unionists (who form a minority in most 
councils in the West of the Province). These calls reflect longstanding deep-seated fears 
concerning the abuses of powers (especially of employment and housing allocations) that 
discredited the pre-1973 system of local government and which, indeed, did so much to 
stoke the embers of inter-communal tension that precipitated the Troubles. Reorganising 
councils is not without difficulties, however. While reference to American or European 
practice suggests that the reallocation of major quango functions to local government is 
perfectly plausible, the pervasive size-ism (‘big is beautiful’) that has informed 
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successive local government reorganizations across the British Isles suggests an end 
product comprising fewer but larger councils and fewer major quangos, with their roles 
being effectively subsumed into the remit of enhanced local authorities – or of course 
government departments or agencies - however configured. Should reform proceed, the 
likelihood of bigger authorities emerging is much higher if Direct Rule remains rather 
than devolution given the widely shared local predilection for small units. 
 
One key consideration with the proposals is the perceived threat posed by any 
substantially reinvigorated tier of local government to the devolved institutions. Simply, 
there may not be room for two major actors on the combined local/regional scene, 
redolent of how the former Belfast Corporation was often perceived as an upstart to the 
old Stormont. The touchpaper for conflict could be finance. Having been excluded from 
its initial remit, the Review has so far said nothing about financing an enlarged portfolio 
of local government functions. Currently, devoid of transparency, financial 
considerations are rarely understood by voters with the result that, while Northern Ireland 
ratepayers fare comparatively well compared with their counterparts in GB, there is a 
widespread feeling of being hard done by. A separate Rating Review exercise has 
proposed discarding the present rating system and a switch to one based on capital values 
(akin to the Council Tax in GB) (DFPNI, 2004). However, with some 80% of Northern 
Ireland’s district councils’ income coming from the district rate (the remainder coming 
from the redistributed proceeds of the NI Regional Rate plus other central government 
grants), any major change in the functional responsibilities of local authorities threatens 
to seriously destabilize the basis of the high degree of (nominal) local financial 
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accountability between citizen and council. Precisely because of their minor (and 
inexpensive) functions, the potential for financial accountability to local voters is much 
stronger than the altogether more tenuous link that exists in GB, where the gearing effect 
attenuates the direct link (though, in practice, like all voting in Northern Ireland, local 
elections invariably revert to type, i.e., a tribal headcount). However, without investing 
local authorities with a more robust source of locally derived revenue (such as local 
income tax - precluded by Westminster), new councils maybe far more dependent on 
Stormont grant with all its attendant consequences. 
 
Given the continuing impasse in the efforts to resuscitate the fledgling devolved 
institutions, reviving local government may bypass the obstacles on the road to 
maintaining and building a (relatively) peaceful Northern Ireland. For sure, local councils 
have been actively engaged in the review process and a measure of their influence can be 
gleaned from the options proposed by the Review team in their consultation document. In 
some ways, after 30 years of constitutional experimentation amid political turbulence, 
local government has remained a stoically democratic forum albeit with tightly 
circumscribed powers. Its time may well have come. That said, not for the first time has 
such a proposition arisen, appearing previously as ‘Model F’ in a Government Working 
Paper (UK Government, 1979), only to be returned to the sagging shelf of failed 
initiatives within the NIO. 
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Nonetheless, respecting the time-honoured practice of rehashing old ideas, in a rather pre-
emptive press release (4 May 2004), the Minister, Ian Pearson, announced that “I see the 
final model including:  
1. A significant reduction on the numbers of public bodies, including health service 
bodies; 
2. Local councils being reduced from 26 to single figures, but having more powers, 
and boundaries that are fully aligned with other service providers in their locality; 
3. Arrangements at a local level to ensure the maintenance of local identify and 
community input to decision-making; and 
4. Robust governance arrangements to ensure transparent decision-making, fairness 
and the protection of minority interests”. 
 
Pearson added that the scale of the proposed reforms will inevitably require a lengthy 
implementation phase. While a final consultation report is anticipated by Spring 2005, the 
RPA announced a 7 council structure as the likely outcome. In achieving coterminosity of 
boundaries, each new unit would average some 250,000 inhabitants with a ceiling of 
300,000 (www.rpani.gov.uk). The likely political control would be: 3 nationalist and 3 
Unionist councils; Belfast would remain under no overall control. In what is “essentially 
a two tier model”, the regional (i.e. upper) level would be responsible for policy 
development, strategic planning, setting standards of service delivery, monitoring that 
delivery, plus delivering regional services. “Most service delivery, however, would be at 
sub-regional level. Services will be delivered by new large, stronger Councils” working 
with “the local offices of regional service providers” (Pearson, 2004). 
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With no short-term prospects for the Assembly’s revival, Direct Rule ministers may be 
prepared to follow-through on this important issue. However, the spectre of the continued 
failure on the macro political front casts its long shadow. Coupled with the call for the 
mechanics of internal power sharing (as provided for in the Agreement) to be 
reconsidered, Peter Robinson, the DUP’s Deputy Leader and erstwhile minister in the 
previous Executive, argued: 
It is impossible to look at the Review of Public Administration outside the content 
of what is happening at the regional level. …. Clearly, arrangements which would 
be suitable in the absence of a devolved administration would not be suitable in 
the event of there being a return to devolution. … There is a direct relationship 
between what arrangements we have at Stormont and what can be done at local 
government level (Robinson, 2003). 
With the DUP now the driving force within Unionism, therefore, any serious movement 
on the RPA might seem inextricably linked with the wider constitutional situation. 
 
Evaluation 
 
No system of public administration is immutable. Shifts in social, economic and political 
circumstances demand periodic re-examination of existing sub-national governance 
(function, form, finance) to test its robustness to meet with the challenges posed of, and 
the expectations placed upon, it. In turn, there are concomitant effects upon the internal 
operation of individual state actors and the conduct of intergovernmental relations. 
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Moreover, with the shift from welfare to regulatory state, there are consequences for the 
relations with the penumbra of other public, private, community and voluntary 
organizations into which each regional and local authority is networked. Cursory 
examination of international practice demonstrates the absence of uniformly accepted and 
applied criteria in devising and constructing structural configurations for government. 
Nonetheless, from our ‘lessons for undertaking reform’, several tentative conclusions can 
be drawn about how reform in Northern Ireland might be assessed. 
 
Above all, if entirely predictably, politics is beginning to shape the reform agenda (and 
reaction to it) in terms of the possible future configuration of new sub-regional structures, 
their likely party political complexion, and the relative complexity of the emerging 
‘super’ councils as they relate to Stormont.  In the bitter context of Northern Ireland’s 
polarised society, the imperative of raw political calculus is all the more acute. 
Nonetheless, other factors are discernible. Befitting the recent focus on structures of 
governance, there is a heavy emphasis on partnership both at council level with other 
providers (public, private, voluntary, community) as well as between the tiers of 
government - regional and sub-regional/local. This emphasis builds on the already 
extensive use of partnership arrangements in local government in respect of disbursing 
EU monies such as PEACE I and II. The ‘bounding’ concept is evident from the work 
reported by the Review team (www.rpani.gov.uk) with a particular stress placed on travel 
to work patterns in the derivation of tentative 6 and 7 council models. These models are 
borne of a gathering momentum for larger units of local government that reflects the 
pervasive size-ism familiar in Great Britain and, while contrary to expressions of local 
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preference, epitomizes Direct Rule thinking. Contrary to ‘organised chaos’ of some 
economic theory, the fragmentation and overlap in many ways so characteristic of the 
present arrangements is eschewed in favour of consolidation through co-terminosity in 
the emerging proposals. Financing the proposals will also be a vexed issue not least 
because of the problems which have arisen in introducing water charges – local people 
(including a cross party consensus of politicians) want to know why they have ‘to pay 
twice for water’ arguing that the Regional Rate includes a charge for water services. Such 
public hostility and pledges of resistance including a non-payment campaign do not bode 
well for a complete review of the financing of local government as the public may well 
conclude that it has been conned – hardly the desired end product of any review. 
 
Inevitably, of course, “no government starts with a tabula rasa - there are historical 
factors and the inertia of the status quo to be taken into account” (Kingdom, 1991, pp.37-
8). Nowhere is the legacy of past events more telling than in Northern Ireland. Despite 
insidious and ongoing paramilitary violence, devolved government (should it be restored) 
and reformed local governance arrangements build in a degree of electoral accountability 
that reaffirms the wider popular desire for long-term stability and peaceful co-existence, 
albeit with different long-term political aspirations. Thus, while the fate of the Belfast 
Agreement itself remains uncertain and its implementation incomplete, a 30 year 
moratorium on long overdue administrative reform has at least been lifted. In breaking 
the impasse, the subsequent launch of the Review of Public Administration – and the 
determination to continue and conclude it before then implementing its recommendations 
- offers the prospect of partial improvement in the provision of public services, local 
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public accountability and value for money. Ian Pearson, the Minister currently 
responsible, claimed the “Review of Public Administration is the most far-reaching 
examination of how public services should be delivered to citizens that I am aware of 
anywhere – apart, possibly, from Iraq” (Press Release, 4 March 2004). Whether the RPA 
merits the Minister’s lofty claims can be debated. In many ways, its parameters have 
already constrained its outcomes. The failure to include a formal consideration of the 
central departments, or the thorny issue of finance, detracts from the RPA, though the 
implications for both cannot be sidestepped and, informally, are recognized as such. 
Certainly, the RPA has been comprehensive, the canvassing of public opinion exhaustive, 
and the output from the extensive engagement of independent research voluminous (see 
RPA website). Deficiencies notwithstanding, there is every prospect that a major 
overhaul and improvement of the system of sub-regional governance in Northern Ireland 
will help to compensate for inertia at the macro level. If, as a result, the local protagonists 
can work together cooperatively where hitherto they have proved incapable of so doing, 
there may yet be hope for political progress on the broader future of Northern Ireland. 
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